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COSMOPOLITAN HOPE1 
Catriona McKinnon 
 
(The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism eds. Gillian Brock and 
Harry Brighouse, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 
234-49). 
 
‘The problems of the world cannot possibly be solved by skeptics or cynics 
whose horizons are limited by the obvious realities. We need men who can 
dream of things that never were and ask, why not?’ (attributed to John F. 
Kennedy) 
 
‘[T]he world is not in itself inhospitable to political justice and its good.  Our 
social world might have been different and there is hope for those at another 
time and place.’  John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:  A Restatement.2   
 
 
§1 Introduction 
 The term ‘cosmopolitanism’ denotes various interconnected projects.  
Many arguments in the literature raise doubts about the relevance of national 
                                                
1  I would like to thank Jeremy Moss for his helpful comments.  I would also like to thank 
audiences who discussed this paper with me at the Birkbeck Philosophy Society and the York 
Political Theory Workshop; in particular, Sue Mendus and Matt Matravers.  
2   John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:  A Restatement (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press, 2001), p. 38. 
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and state boundaries to questions of justice:  these questions connect with 
questions about the scope, assignment, and nature of cosmopolitan duties of 
justice.  Cutting across these debates are discussions about the content of 
principles of global justice, raising questions about the universality of the 
values realized by these principles.  And then there are various detailed 
questions about the nature of the institutions fit to deliver global justice.   
 These strands of cosmopolitan thought are important and flourishing.  
However, none of them directly addresses an objection to cosmopolitanism 
common outside of academic circles, which is that although the cosmopolitan 
ideal is acceptable in theory, it will never be realised in practice:  
cosmopolitans who hope for the realisation of this ideal are well-meaning but 
deluded people who lack a proper grasp of how the realities of human nature 
and social interaction limit what is achievable in political practice.  The 
objection is that even if the moral arguments for cosmopolitanism work, hope 
for a cosmopolitan future is naive and misguided.  I shall refer to this as the 
‘hard nosed’ objection. 
 The hard nosed objection can be made in response to any ideal-
oriented political project.  Although my concern here is with cosmopolitanism, 
it will help to fix our thoughts to consider the objection as expressed against 
communism by Erwin Goldstine in Philip Roth’s novel I Married a Communist. 
… a person with an average intelligence cannot take this story, this fairy 
tale of Communism, and swallow it.  ‘We will do something that will be 
wonderful …’  But we know what our brother is, don’t we?  He’s a shit.  
And we know what our friend is, don’t we?  He’s a semi-shit.  And we 
are semi-shits.  So how can it be wonderful?  Not even cynicism, not 
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even skepticism, just ordinary powers of human observation tell us that 
is not possible.3 
 Substitute ‘cosmopolitanism’ for ‘communism’ in this passage and we 
have the objection I shall address.  Despite Goldstine’s claims to the contrary, 
the hard nosed objection is a subtle form of scepticism about cosmopolitan 
justice.  What the hard nosed objector is sceptical about is not the moral 
requirement to seek global justice that lies at the heart of cosmopolitanism.  
The hard nosed objector accepts (or, at least, does not reject) this 
requirement and instead questions  - often in knowing, world weary tones –  
whether it is reasonable to hope that the state of affairs aimed at by 
requirement will be realised.   
 There are two ways to cash out this objection.  First, that the 
cosmopolitan objective is not a legitimate object of hope; and second, that 
cosmopolitan hope, even if legitimate, is unsound.  Pace the objector, I shall 
argue that cosmopolitan hope is both legitimate and sound; that is, I shall 
argue that cosmopolitan hope is consistent with and permitted by the 
cosmopolitan requirement.  This is sufficient to rebut the hard nosed 
objection.  However, I shall also sketch two arguments for the stronger thesis 
that retaining commitment to the cosmopolitan ideal requires cosmopolitan 
hope, which means that the hard nosed objection cannot be made at all.  Let 
me begin by laying out the cosmopolitan ideal, and the moral requirement that 
accompanies it.  
 
§2 The Cosmopolitan Ideal 
The ideal I take to be common to all forms of cosmopolitanism is this: 
                                                
3   Philip Roth, I Married a Communist (London:  Vintage, 1999), p. 95. 
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The cosmopolitan ideal:  A world in which some fundamental principles 
of justice govern relations between all persons in all places. 
 
The moral requirement that accompanies the cosmopolitan ideal, and 
which is common to all forms of cosmopolitanism, is this: 
 
The cosmopolitan requirement:  any commitment to some fundamental 
principles of justice at the domestic level ought to be extended so as to 
generate principles of justice with cosmopolitan scope.4 
 
 The objective of cosmopolitan hope is the achievement of the 
cosmopolitan ideal of global justice through action fit to satisfy the demands 
of the cosmopolitan requirement.  What cosmopolitans hope for is the 
extension of commitments to justice at the domestic level (however these 
commitments are generated, and whatever their content) to the global level 
so as to create a world governed by principles of global justice.  The hard 
nosed objector aims to prise apart acceptance of the cosmopolitan 
requirement (which she endorses, or at least does not reject) and 
commitment to – as evinced in hope for - the cosmopolitan ideal:  the hard 
nosed objector accepts the demands of the cosmopolitan requirement but 
rejects hope for the cosmopolitan ideal as naive and misguided.  The hard 
nosed objector is not an outright sceptic about all aspects of 
                                                
4  This formulation owes much to Simon Caney’s statement of the ‘principal cosmopolitan 
claim’, ‘International Distributive Justice’, Political Studies, Vol. XLIX, No. 5, 2001, pp. 974-97, 
p. 977. 
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cosmopolitanism:  she allows that we have the obligations stated in the 
cosmopolitan requirement, but thinks that these obligations can and ought to 
be defended as such without false hope for the world of global justice 
constitutive of the cosmopolitan ideal.  The hard nosed objector is not a 
sceptic about the cosmopolitan obligations that we owe to one another, or the 
cosmopolitan rights that we hold against one another.  Rather, the focus of 
the hard nosed objector’s scepticism is the prospects for the creation of a 
cosmopolitan world order through the performance of the obligations laid 
down by the cosmopolitan requirement. 
 The form of cosmopolitan hope I shall defend can now be stated.  
Cosmopolitan hope is hope for the realisation of the cosmopolitan ideal:  the 
objective of cosmopolitan hope is a world in which some fundamental 
principles of justice governing relations between individuals and groups at the 
domestic level also govern such relations at the global level.  To hope for the 
cosmopolitan ideal is to hope that persons extend their commitment to some 
fundamental principles of justice at the domestic level to the global level, as 
demanded by the cosmopolitan requirement .  The hard nosed objection is 
that hope for the cosmopolitan ideal, and the concomitant hope for the 
extension of commitment demanded by the cosmopolitan requirement, is 
naive because it fails to take seriously facts about the world which make the 
achievement of this state through action fit to satisfy the requirement 
impossible or unlikely, even though the requirement itself is legitimate.  In that 
case, cosmopolitan hope is either illegitimate (because the cosmopolitan 
objective is not a fit object of hope), or unsound (because one or more 
components of cosmopolitan hope must be rejected).  By way of addressing 
 6 
the first version of the hard nosed objection I shall give a general account of 
the nature of hope. 
 
§3 Hope 
 Cosmopolitan hope is hope for a specific objective as laid out in the 
cosmopolitan ideal.  Let me outline in general terms what it is to have a 
specific hope before considering whether the cosmopolitan ideal yields a 
legitimate objective for specific hope.5 
 Specific hope is hope aimed at an objective which exists in the future, 
is believed to be good by the hoper, and is desired by the hoper in virtue of 
this belief.  Furthermore, hope generates a disposition to act so as to make 
the realisation of hope’s objective more probable whenever possible, all else 
being equal.  Without this disposition, a hoper lacks the practical commitment 
to her objective that is characteristic of hope:  we would think it odd to 
describe a person as hoping for an objective if she fails to act so as to realise 
the objective when presented with a real opportunity to do so. 
 The motivation to pursue an objective that issues from hope must be 
distinguished from motivational states with different provenances.  The 
motivation to pursue hope’s objective consists of a desire for the objective in 
virtue of the hoper’s belief that the objective is good.  In contrast, a motivation 
to pursue an objective which does not issue from hope (if it is to be 
characterised in terms of belief and desire at all) can consist of a desire for 
                                                
5  For a good general account of different forms of hope, and useful specific accounts of how 
the concept of hope figures in the work of Immanuel Kant, Ernst Bloch, and Gabriel Marcel, 
see J.J. Godfrey, A Philosophy of Human Hope (Dordrecht:  Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1987). 
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the objective in spite of the agent’s belief that the objective is bad.  For 
example, if I desire a glass of wine and I believe that there is a bottle on the 
shelf, I will be motivated to open the bottle and pour a glass, all else being 
equal; and I may be so motivated despite my belief that drinking wine will do 
me harm.  However, with respect to hope, it must be the case that I desire 
what I hope for because I believe it to be good:  we do not hope for objectives 
we believe to be bad (even if we are nevertheless motivated to pursue them). 
A further component of specific hope is a belief about the future in 
which its objective exists.  This belief can be characterised in two ways:  (1) 
that the objective is possible; (2) that the objective is probable.  The success 
of the hard nosed objection to cosmopolitan hope (on the first interpretation of 
it) turns on which of these descriptions of the belief about the future in which 
hope’s objective exists is accurate. 
 On the first ‘possibility’ interpretation, specific hope involves the belief 
that the objective of hope is both logically and physically possible.  
Commitment to the logical possibility of hope’s objective provides a minimal 
constraint on the content of the belief about the future in which hope’s 
objective exists:  all it rules out is hope for an objective which contains a 
formal contradiction (for example, hope that I both pass and fail the exam).   
Commitment to the physical possibility of hope’s objective is a more 
demanding constraint.  What I mean by the claim that an objective is 
‘physically possible’ is that, given what we know about the world and the 
agents inhabiting it, that objective could exist in the world.6  Thus, 
                                                
6   For more on the senses of possibility appealed to here see the entry on ‘possibility’ in Ted 
Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
1995), pp. 706-7. 
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commitment to this constraint ensures that the hoper believes that her 
objective could be realised in the world she inhabits.  This constraint means 
that the hoper believes that the future in which a hoped for objective exists is 
her future.  Without this constraint a person could counter intuitively be said to 
hope for an objective she believes to be logically possible, but which she 
believes could not be realised in the actual world.  To illustrate, consider a 
person who believes that it would be a good thing to live forever, desires this 
for herself in virtue of this belief, and is disposed to do things she believes will 
increase the odds of her living forever, whenever possible, even though she 
knows that, qua human, she cannot live forever.  On the account of hope just 
suggested, this person is not accurately described as hoping to live forever.  
Although the proposition towards which her attitudes of belief and desire are 
directed  - ‘that I should live forever’ – involve no logical contradiction, the 
state described by this proposition - that of eternal life - is not physically 
possible, given human biology.  Rather than describing this person as hoping 
for everlasting life, we would describe her as wishing for or fantasising about 
it.   
 On the second ‘probability’ interpretation, specific hope involves not 
only the belief that the objective of hope is possible, but furthermore the belief 
that it is probable.  This interpretation should be rejected on the grounds that 
it has the unwelcome implication that hope collapses either into blind faith, or 
into optimism, and there is good reason to think that hope is distinct from both 
these attitudes towards future objectives.  Let me explain. 
 There are two ways in which the judgement that hope’s objective is 
probable could be supported.  First, by reference to the hoper’s belief that she 
has evidence to support this probability judgement, and second, by reference 
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to a non-evidence related belief held by the hoper (for example, a belief in 
divine providence).  If the hoper’s judgement that her objective is probable is 
supported by an evidence-related belief, then her hope takes the form of 
optimism.7  The optimist believes that the future is likely to bring to pass those 
things she desires and believes to be good; the optimist believes, let us say, 
that the probability of the objectives she desires is 0.5 or more.  The optimist’s 
reason for believing this is that she believes she has evidence that it is 
probable that her desires will be fulfilled.  The evidence that the optimist 
marshals to support her judgements about the future sometimes turns out to 
be nothing more than a projection of her own good will on to the world:  
optimists are often nothing but wishful thinkers.  However, that is besides the 
point.  The optimist believes that she has evidence for judgements about the 
future, regardless of whether the evidence she believes herself to have is 
good evidence (or evidence at all): in virtue of the evidence she believes that 
she has, the optimist thinks that the future is laid out in a way that is likely to 
satisfy her desires for the objectives about which she is optimistic.  In 
contrast, if the hoper’s judgement that her objective is probable is supported 
by a non-evidence related belief, then her hope takes the form of blind faith.  
Here, the hoper judges that the probability of her objective is 0.5 or more, and 
supports this judgement by reference to, for example, her belief in the 
existence of a benevolent god.  
 Neither of these characterisations of hope is satisfactory, as can be 
seen by considering the following example.  Imagine a mother whose teenage 
daughter has been missing for six months who retains hope that one day she 
will return.  The mother does not think that the return of her daughter is 
                                                
7   See Margaret Boden, ‘Optimism’, Philosophy, Vol. XLI, No. 158, 1966, pp. 291-303. 
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probable, which is not to say that she thinks it is improbable either.  Rather, 
she makes no judgements about its probability.  That is what makes her 
situation so painful:  she simply does not know.  The mother does not make 
predictions about what the future contains in her hoping:  she does not 
‘pocket the future in advance’.8  It might be that she keeps open the possibility 
of her daughter’s return without calculating the odds because she has no 
evidence which enables her to make this calculation, and she is agnostic 
about the existence of a benevolent god.  However, the point is that her 
failure to make probability judgements about her daughter’s return does not 
prevent her from hoping for it.  That the mother makes no judgements about 
the probability of her daughter’s return, but is accurately described as hoping 
for her daughter’s return, militates against any account of hope which makes 
judgements of the probability of hope’s objectives a necessary component of 
hope, whether supported by evidence-related beliefs or not.9 
 Refraining from judging the probability of an objective is, I think, 
characteristic of all forms of specific hope:  specific hope is characterised by a 
                                                
8  Philip Stratton-Lake, The Future of Reason:  Kant’s conception of the finitude of thinking, 
PhD thesis, University of Essex, 1990, p. 129. 
9   A qualification is necessary here.  In order for the mother to keep alive hope for her 
daughter’s return it must be the case that she does not judge her daughter’s return to be 
contracertain or certain.  The judgement that her daughter’s return is contracertain - that is, 
has a probability of 0 - is inconsistent with the belief that her daughter’s return is physically 
possible.  And the judgement that her daughter’s return is certain - that is, has a probability of 
1 - is characteristic not of hope for an objective, but rather of expectation or anticipation.  In 
that case, judgements about the probability of hope’s objectives are constitutive of hope, but 
only to the extent that the probability objective is not judged to be 0 or 1.  (I shall suppress 
this qualification in the subsequent discussion). 
 11 
radical uncertainty with respect to its objectives, which shows that it is a 
mistake to characterise it in terms of probability judgements about these 
objectives.  Of course, specific hope can be -- and often is -- accompanied by 
blind faith or optimistic judgements about the probability of hope’s objective.  
But these judgements are not components of hope. 
 This fact about hope explains why pessimism with respect to an 
objective differs from hopelessness with respect to that objective.  Pessimism 
with respect to a specific objective, like optimism, is either premised on the 
pessimist’s belief that she has evidence to support her belief that the  
objective she is pessimistic about is improbable, or on a non-evidence related 
belief (perhaps the pessimist is just a misery guts, or believes in the existence 
of a malevolent god).  In contrast, a loss of hope with respect to an objective 
does not depend on judgements about the objective’s improbability; indeed, it 
is a feature of specific hope that it often becomes more intense the less 
probable the objective is believed by the hoper to be.  In that case, pessimism 
about an objective and hope for that objective are consistent:  hope can be 
retained even in the bleakest of circumstances.  A loss of specific hope only 
attends the hoper’s judgement that her objective is impossible, or 
contracertain.  Upon making such a judgement the hoper despairs of realising 
her objective.  
Given this account of specific hope it is clear that the cosmopolitan 
ideal yields a legitimate objective for specific hope.  The cosmopolitan 
objective exists in the future, and is believed to be good and possible by 
cosmopolitans who desire it in virtue of their belief that it is good, and yields a 
disposition in them to act so as to make the realisation of the cosmopolitan 
objective more likely, all else being equal.  Furthermore, and importantly, it is 
 12 
not the case that those who hope for the cosmopolitan objective must be 
optimistic about this objective.10 The upshot of the discussion in this section is 
that hard nosed objectors who claim that cosmopolitan hope is misguided 
because the cosmopolitan ideal is unlikely to be realised make a misplaced 
objection.  Cosmopolitans can be, and often are, deeply pessimistic about the 
prospects for realising the cosmopolitan ideal, and yet continue to hope for it.  
To reach these cosmopolitans the hard nosed objector must claim that 
although cosmopolitan hope is legitimate insofar as it yields an objective 
which can be hoped for, such hope is not sound.   
 
§4 Is Cosmopolitan Hope Sound? 
 
Specific hope has four fundamental components.  
 
 (1) a belief that hope’s objective is possible;  
(2)  a belief that hope’s objective is good;  
(3) a desire for hope’s objective in virtue of the belief that it is good;  
(4) a disposition to act so as to make hope’s objective more probable (all else 
being equal) yielded by (1) - (3).   
 
 There are conditions related to each of these components according to 
which a specific hope can be judged to be sound.  The first condition relates 
to the belief that the objective of hope is good:  a hard nosed objector might 
claim that this provides a component of sound hope if and only if this belief is 
                                                
10   See, for example, Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice (Boulder, CO:  Westview 
Press, 2002),  p. 176. 
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true.  So, let us turn to the ways in which a belief about the goodness of any 
hope’s objectives could be false. 
  There are some objectives of hope -- malformed objectives -- which, 
we think, ought not to be hoped for.  Some hopes are plain spiteful and 
malicious:  hope for an innocent person to come to some harm.  Others might 
be well-grounded but still nefarious in content:  hope for an old enemy to 
contract a fatal disease, or to die poor and lonely.  Still others are personal 
and born of unhappiness:  hope to be run over by a bus, or killed in a plane 
crash.  We think that a person with such hopes would be better off without 
them.  This intuitive judgement can be cashed out in at least three ways: 
 
(i)  that the hope’s objective is morally objectionable 
(ii)  that the hoper would be a better person without these hopes 
(iii) that the hoper would do better without these hopes 
 
 The first interpretation (i) imports moral and ethical values into the 
judgements of malformed objectives.  The second interpretation (ii) translates 
these judgements of the objective into judgements of the person who hopes 
for the objective.  The third interpretation (iii) treats malformed objectives as 
instrumental impediments to the achievement of the hoper’s other goals and 
aims; here, hope’s objectives are judged by criteria of instrumental rationality.  
The three interpretations are consistent if it is the case that a person does 
better only when she is better - that is, if instrumental success in achieving 
goals and aims matters only when those goals and aims are morally or 
ethically good – and if the moral quality of a person can be judged by the 
moral quality of what she hopes for. 
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 Before considering how these criticisms might apply to cosmopolitan 
hope it is worth noting that criticisms which focus on the dispositional 
component of hope in (4) collapse into one or another of the criticisms of the 
goodness of hope’s objectives as laid out in (i)-(iii).  In criticism of the 
disposition to act so as to make the cosmopolitan objective probable (4), it 
might be claimed  
 
(a) that this disposition harms the hoper, or 
(b) that this disposition harms others 
 
 If (a) is claimed then only (ii) or (iii) above can be intended:  the harm 
that the disposition causes the hoper can only be moral harm, or harm to the 
hoper’s capacities to pursue whatever other ends she has.  If (b) is claimed, 
then what we are offered is an interpretation of (i) above.  So, in dismissing 
criticisms of the first component of cosmopolitan hope as they appear in (i), 
(ii), and (iii) I shall also be dismissing criticisms of the fourth component of 
cosmopolitan hope (and I will not return to these criticisms later). 
Is the cosmopolitan objective malformed in any of these ways?  With 
respect to (iii), it is hard to see how hope for the cosmopolitan ideal must 
impede any cosmopolitan hoper’s pursuit of their other aims.  Of course, we 
can dream up an example of an obsessed cosmopolitan who spends day and 
night trying to convince people to extend their commitment to basic rights 
beyond their domestic context by trying to show how reasoning about rights in 
the domestic context must transfer to the global context.  But what is wrong 
here has nothing to do with the content of the hoper’s objective, and 
everything to do with the manner in which it is pursued.  If the hard nosed 
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objection to the soundness of cosmopolitan hope relates to the moral quality 
of the cosmopolitan objective, then it must be cashed out via the claims in (i) 
and/or (ii). 
 To object as in (i) that the cosmopolitan objective is malformed 
according to moral criteria requires an argument to show that there is 
something morally objectionable about a situation in which people extend 
their commitment to principles of justice in a local context to a global context, 
whatever these principles are, so as to create a cosmopolitan world of global 
justice.  If we are of a virtue ethics bent, this claim can be interpreted so as to 
yield the putative hard nosed judgement informed by (ii) that a person who 
hopes for the cosmopolitan objective would be a better person without this 
hope.   
The problem with both of these interpretations is simply that they are 
not available to the hard nosed objector.  As I made clear in the Introduction, 
the hard nosed objector does not question the legitimacy of the cosmopolitan 
moral requirement; to return to Erwin Goldstine, his claim is that he and 
humanity are “shits” or “semi-shits”, and that this prevents them from realising 
a “wonderful” political state.  What the hard nosed objector doubts is whether 
hope for the cosmopolitan ideal to be realised through action fit to satisfy the 
requirement is well placed, whereas the objection under consideration 
addresses the moral quality of the objective of cosmopolitan hope. Given that 
the hard nosed objector accepts that the cosmopolitan requirement is a 
legitimate moral requirement, she cannot object to cosmopolitan hope by 
questioning the morality of its objective as aimed at by the requirement.   
 The next possibility for interpretation of the hard nosed objection is that 
it relates to the belief that the cosmopolitan objective is logically and 
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physically possible.  Criteria for the soundness of this component relate to the 
truth of the belief:  a hard nosed objector might insist that this belief must be 
true in order for the hope to be sound. 
   To believe that an objective is physically possible is to believe that it 
is logically possible and that it could be realised in the actual world.  So, to 
show that belief in the cosmopolitan objective is false requires showing either 
that it contains or entails a logical contradiction, or that it could not exist in the 
actual world.  If either of these things can be established, then the hard nosed 
objector can reject cosmopolitan hope on the grounds that it involves a false 
belief.  It is clear that the cosmopolitan objective does not contain or entail a 
logical contradiction.  In that case, the hard nosed objector must show that 
the cosmopolitan objective could not be realised in the actual world, despite 
its achievement in other possible worlds which differ from this one.  How 
might this case be argued? 
 Here, hard nosed objectors tend to invite reflection on history and 
human nature.  Surely, they argue, any honest and sober reflection on the 
course of human history shows that the belief that human beings as they are 
could overcome all the enmities and hatreds that divide them in order to 
extend their local commitment to justice so as to achieve the cosmopolitan 
ideal is false (remember Erwin Goldstine).  Regardless of what is true in other 
possible worlds, in this one the record of history shows that it is not possible 
for people to transform their reasoning about justice in the way stated by the 
cosmopolitan objective.   
 There are at least three reflections which should lead us to be 
suspicious of such arguments.  First, although it is true that human history is 
bathed in blood and hatred, it is also true that great progress has been made 
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with respect to the extension of the scope of principles of justice so as to 
include groups of people who were hitherto oppressed or despised.  In many 
places slavery has been abolished, women have the vote, homosexuality is 
not a crime, and religion can be practised freely.  Of course, it might be 
objected that these inclusions do not really represent progress, but we can 
safely ignore this response.  Second, even if such progress had not been 
made there would still not be grounds for asserting the physical impossibility 
of the cosmopolitan objective.  Human beings are malleable:  their past 
practices do not determine their future ones.  Finally, cosmopolitans can 
accept that human history makes realisation of the cosmopolitan ideal 
overwhelmingly unlikely, but as we saw in §3, pessimism with respect to the 
prospects for an objective is quite consistent with hope for that objective.  
 The final form that an objection to the soundness of cosmopolitan hope 
might take relates to the desire for its objective in virtue of the belief that the 
objective is good.11  A prima facie attractive way to think about criteria of 
soundness according to which the desire for any hope’s objective is to be 
judged relates to the extent to which it harmonises with the proper purposes 
and functioning of human beings:  the desire component of cosmopolitan 
hope is sound if and only if this desire promotes – or is at least consistent with 
– the proper purposes of human beings.   
                                                
11  There are real problems raised by the question of whether a belief in the goodness of an 
objective can generate a desire for it, or whether the motivation to pursue a good objective 
requires an extant desire for the objective believed to be good.  But this is a problem for 
anyone interested in the relationship between commitment to a moral ideal or principle and 
the motivation to act so as to realise that ideal or satisfy that principle.  I make no comment 
on this tangled web here. 
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 A hard nosed objection taking this form would have to show that 
desiring the cosmopolitan objective conflicts with proper human purposes, 
even when the content of the objective is not morally objectionable (so as to 
avoid the collapse of this objection into the one considered earlier which 
relates to the moral quality of hope’s objective).  The cosmopolitan objective 
is a state in which persons extend their commitment to some fundamental 
local principles of justice to the global level.  It might be objected that any 
person who desires this objective has a conception of humanity as possessed 
of, and capable of exercising, their reason in the same way, so as to extend 
their local commitments to principles of justice in order to come to accept the 
same global principles of justice.  It could be argued that this is in conflict with 
the proper purposes and functioning of a human being because part of what it 
is for any person to exercise her reason correctly is for her to accept that 
others may legitimately exercise their reason in a different way.  So, the hard 
nosed objector might claim that to desire the cosmopolitan objective is to 
desire something which must be rejected by the hoper when she exercises 
her reason correctly.  If we think that the correct use of reason is part of any 
account of proper human functioning and purposes, then a desire for the 
cosmopolitan objective is unsound.   
 One way in which this objection can be made in more detail is with a 
version of Rawls’ ‘burdens of judgement’ argument for acceptance of the 
permanence of reasonable pluralism.12  Rawls argues that part of what it is for 
a person to exercise her reason correctly with respect to questions of justice 
is for her to accept that everyone’s reason operates under ‘burdens of 
judgement’.  The burdens of judgement are particularly weighty with respect 
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to political matters (such as those addressed by cosmopolitanism), thinks 
Rawls, ‘in view of the very great complexity of the questions raised, the often 
impressionistic nature of the evidence, and the severity of the conflicts they 
commonly address’.13  The existence of these burdens means that we should 
not expect the free exercise of reason by all persons to lead each of them to 
reach the same conclusions on moral, religious, and philosophical questions 
as they bear on their political judgements:  they might, but this would be a 
result of coincidence rather than as a result of the conclusions they come to 
share having been uniquely determined by reason.  Rawls’ argument is that 
the correct exercise of reason by a person will lead her to accept that the 
correct exercise of reason by others need not deliver agreement between 
them on various important questions.  Making the hard nosed objection in 
these terms, the argument is that the desire for the cosmopolitan objective 
conflicts with the demands of reason.  The burdens of judgement make it 
unreasonable to expect that all persons should employ the same method of 
reasoning to reach agreement on global principles of justice.  If we think it is 
an important part of proper human functioning that reason is exercised 
correctly, then desire for the cosmopolitan objective makes cosmopolitan 
hope unsound. 
 This version of the objection makes an illicit move.  It is not necessary 
for realisation of the cosmopolitan objective through satisfaction of the 
cosmopolitan requirement that all persons employ the same method of 
reasoning to support global principles of justice.  Rather, the cosmopolitan 
                                                                                                                                      
12  I do not attribute the following argument to Rawls. 
13   John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 36.  See also Political Liberalism (New York:  
Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 54-7. 
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requirement states that each person ought to extend commitments to local 
principles of justice to justify the same principles at the global level, whatever 
the reasoning they use to support this commitment.  It is consistent with 
realisation of the cosmopolitan ideal through this requirement that there is a 
plurality of methods of reasoning about global justice, and desire for the 
cosmopolitan objective carries no more of a requirement for uniformity than 
the ideal that is realised when the objective is achieved.  Given that the 
cosmopolitan requirement governs the relationship between reasoning about 
justice in local and global contexts, if reasoning in local contexts is diverse, 
then the cosmopolitan requirement does not demand uniformity of reasoning 
to support global principles.  All it demands is the extension in each local 
context of reasoning-generated commitments to local principles of justice to 
the global level.  In that case, there can be as many paths to global principles 
of justice as there are local contexts. 
 
§5 Is Cosmopolitan Hope Required?   
 The argument thus far has shown that cosmopolitan hope is consistent 
with, and thus permitted by, commitment to the cosmopolitan requirement:  §3 
established the legitimacy of the cosmopolitan ideal as an objective of hope, 
and §4 that cosmopolitan hope is sound.  However, in response to the hard 
nosed objector we may want to make the stronger claim that cosmopolitan 
hope is furthermore required given commitment to the cosmopolitan 
requirement.  I shall indicate two ways in which this stronger conclusion could 
be established. 
 The first argument invokes the Kantian principle ‘“ought” implies “can”’.  
This principle states that it must be possible to perform the actions, or create 
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the state of affairs, demanded by any moral requirements expressable in an 
“ought” statement.  If the Kantian principle is true then hard nosed acceptance 
of the cosmopolitan requirement straightforwardly requires acceptance that 
what it aims at is possible (as argued in §3).  However, hard nosed 
acceptance of the cosmopolitan requirement as a moral requirement also 
involves acceptance that what it aims at is good.  If we ought to desire what is 
good, and be disposed to bring it about wherever possible, then anyone who 
accepts the cosmopolitan requirement ought to hope for the realisation of the 
cosmopolitan ideal, because the requirement aims at this ideal.  In virtue of 
accepting the cosmopolitan requirement the hard nosed objector is committed 
to hope for the cosmopolitan ideal.   
 The second argument is also Kantian.  The hard nosed objector 
endorses the cosmopolitan requirement, which demands the extension of 
local commitments to justice to the global level.  The hard nosed objection 
aims to prise apart commitment to this requirement from hope for the 
cosmopolitan ideal wherein the extension creates a world of global justice:  
one hard nosed objection (considered in §2) is that hope for this ideal is 
misguided given facts about the world and human beings which make the 
ideal impossible.  However, we might claim that it is not facts about the world 
or human nature that make cosmopolitan hope misguided, but rather the hard 
nosed conception of the cosmopolitan ideal as impossible itself that 
undermines cosmopolitan hope, and that commitment to the cosmopolitan 
requirement requires the abandonment of this hard nosed attitude to the 
cosmopolitan ideal through the cultivation of cosmopolitan hope.   
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Consider an analogy.14  A person stands at the edge of a crevasse and 
is committed to continuing forward.  In order to be able to jump across she 
has to believe that she can make the jump and, importantly, this belief alters 
the probability of making a successful jump:  if she cannot talk herself into this 
state of belief then her ability to make the jump will be impaired and she is 
less likely to be successful than if she believes that she can do it.  Making the 
jump as if she can reach the other side increases the likelihood that she will in 
fact reach the other side.  We might claim that the hard nosed objector is in 
the same position as the ravine jumper with respect to the cosmopolitan ideal.  
Whereas the ravine jumper is committed to continuing forward, the objector is 
committed to extending her commitments to justice in the way demanded by 
the cosmopolitan requirement.  The ravine jumper who doubts her ability to 
make the jump thereby lessens her chances of successfully making the jump; 
the objector who questions possibility of the cosmopolitan ideal thereby 
impairs her capacity to act so as to satisfy the cosmopolitan requirement.  
The requirement demands of each person that she extend her commitment to 
justice at the local level to the global level:  if I believe, in a hard nosed way, 
that the ideal to be realised by satisfaction of this requirement by all persons 
is impossible then my own capacity to act so as to satisfy this requirement will 
be damaged.  By being hard nosed with respect to the cosmopolitan ideal, the 
objector deprives herself of the motivation to act in the way demanded by the 
cosmopolitan requirement:  what is the point of such action, given that the 
ideal towards which the requirement points is ultimately quixotic?  In virtue of 
the practical demands made by the cosmopolitan requirement, a hard nosed 
objector genuinely committed to it must not divest herself of the motivation to 
                                                
14   Thanks are due to Sue Mendus for discussion on this point. 
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pursue it by judging it to be impossible:  she must act as if the objective is 
possible, which is tantamount to cherishing specific hope for it.15 
 
§6 Conclusion 
 To recap, the hard nosed objection to cosmopolitan hope is that 
although the cosmopolitan requirement is legitimate, hope for the 
cosmopolitan ideal is misplaced.  I have considered different ways in which 
the hard nosed objection might be understood.  First, that the cosmopolitan 
ideal is highly improbable, and so not a fit object of hope.  In response, I 
argued that hope does not involve judgements of the probability of hope’s 
objectives, in which case this criticism misses its target.  Second, I considered 
various hard nosed ways of attacking the four components of cosmopolitan 
hope, and I argued that none of them establishes that such hope is unsound.  
Furthermore, I suggested in the last section that the commitment to the 
cosmopolitan requirement on the part of the hard nosed objector requires 
cosmopolitan hope.  If this stronger thesis is true then the objection not only 
fails to show that hope for the cosmopolitan ideal ought to be abandoned, but 
is furthermore internally inconsistent:  commitment to the cosmopolitan 
requirement makes cosmopolitan hope a duty. 
                                                
15   Kant makes a similar point when he claims the following with respect to the ‘irresistible 
veto’ that ‘There shall be no war’:  “even if the fulfilment of this pacific intention were forever 
to remain a pious hope, we should still not be deceiving ourselves if we made it our maxim to 
work unceasingly towards it, for it is our duty to do so.”  Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of 
Morals Part I, §II:  Public Right, in Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press), p. 174. 
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 In conclusion, the discussion here has both a political and a 
philosophical focus.  The political focus is on the nature and demands of 
cosmopolitanism.  The (more oblique) philosophical focus is on the 
relationship between moral requirements, moral ideals, and moral motivation.  
The philosophical contention to which the arguments here contribute is that 
acceptance of any moral requirement demands commitment to a future ideal 
state of affairs in which all persons act so as to satisfy that requirement.  To 
characterise the commitment to an ideal that acceptance of a moral 
requirement carries in terms of hope is to characterise it as a practical 
commitment.  When I accept a moral requirement I must commit to more than 
just the thought that it would be nice if that requirement were satisfied in all 
cases:  I must commit to action to bring about that state of affairs, and this 
commitment rules out a conception of that future state of affairs as 
impossible.  In relation to hard nosed people, the challenge is this:  either 
abandon commitment to the cosmopolitan requirement, or cultivate hope for a 
future world of global justice. 
 
